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Abstract--This paper presents a methodology for the 
implementation of new EMS tools aiming to assist, in real 
time, transmission system operators to avoid dynamic 
security problems, after short-circuits that may lead to large 
wind power losses. In order to overcome high computa ional 
efforts, that are required by conventional dynamic simulation 
tools, the proposed methodology was developed using 
automatic learning techniques. The quality of this approach is 
demonstrated by the results that were provided to solve a 
security problem of an interconnected test system. 
 
Index Terms-- Interconnected power system, Dynamic 
security assessment, Wind power generation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, a high growth rate of wind power 
production has been observed in interconnected power 
systems. It also happens that wind generators initially 
installed had not the capability to stay connected to the 
grid after short-circuits (the so called fault ride through 
capability - FRT), as it is presently required. According to 
several studies, carried out for expected near future 
operating scenarios of the UCTE interconnected system 
[1]-[2], simple line faults may provoke large and sudden 
power generation losses that violate the UCTE security 
criteria, due to the tripping out of these older wind power 
plants. 
As a result of the increase of wind power production in 
Europe, the usage of the interconnected transmission lines 
has been growing. In fact, as described in [3], the high 
wind power production levels that are expected in Europe, 
in a near future, may cause steady-state grid bottlenecks on 
internal and cross border transmission lines of the UCTE 
interconnected system. 
Regarding these two aspects, a simple line fault may
provoke sudden and major wind power losses in a control 
area. This power unbalance may lead, due to the activation 
of the European primary control regulation, to overloads in 
transmission lines that may provoke a set of undesired 
cascading events that, afterwards, may involve load 
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curtailment or even system collapse in the affected areas. 
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) and tertiary contr l 
will take care of interchange power flow deviations and, 
therefore, will act to eliminate transmission lines overload 
problems in the post-fault steady-state conditions. 
However, these are typically slow control actions that take 
some time to eliminate interchange deviations and, 
therefore, do not avoid temporary overload problems in 
transmission lines. 
The measures that TSO have been adopting, trying to 
overcome dynamic security problems in interconnected 
systems having large wind power production, include the 
definition of new grid codes that demand FRT capabilities 
for the new wind power generators. However, the 
implementation of such requirements took some time, 
leading to the present operation of part of the European 
system with high values of wind power production without 
FRT capabilities, which may lead to temporary overload 
security problems in transmission and interconnection 
lines. This is namely the case of the Iberian system, where 
TSO admit wind power curtailment when there is a risk of 
such problem. 
In order to deal with such problems, specific security 
assessment tools, able to provide on-line security 
evaluation regarding transmission lines temporary 
congestions need to be developed. For insecure operating 
scenarios, these tools must also be capable of sugge tin  
preventive control measures, in order to avoid the overload 
detected problems. This paper describes the approach 
developed to design such tools. 
To measure the quality of the proposed approach, a 
performance evaluation was carried out by applying it to 
solve a security problem of an interconnected system with 
similarities with the Portuguese system, which was created 
for test purposes. 
In order to follow on-line time requirements, the 
proposed approach was developed using Automatic 
Learning (AL) techniques. Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) were chosen to perform dynamic security 
monitoring functions, while Linear Regression Models 
(LRM) were selected to provide preventive control 
measures, by solving linear optimization problems. This 
work also shows that, for the dynamic security problem 
under evaluation, more accurate linear security structu es 
may be obtained by exploiting a hybrid technique, 
denominated in this work Linear Regression Trees (LRT). 
The developed work includes the following main step: 
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 STEP 1: Creation of an Interconnected Test System; 
 STEP 2: Data Set Generation; 
 STEP 3: Security Evaluation with AL Techniques; 
 STEP 4: Preventive Control Measures Supply; 
 
which are properly described in the remaining sections of 
this paper. 
II.  STEP 1: CREATION OF AN INTERCONNECTED TEST 
SYSTEM 
The single-line diagram of the created test system is 
presented Fig. 1, where control area 1 corresponds to an 
approximation of the Portuguese transmission system. This 
research was focused on the security of control area 1. 
Therefore, in order to model the interconnections with 
neighboring systems, an equivalent of the 
Spanish/European UCTE system was modeled, in control 
area 2, by using one busbar with equivalent generati g 
units. 
In order to reduce power system dimension, without 
losing relevant information for the simulation of the 
dynamic behavior under evaluation, all the generating units 
of control area 1 are equivalent machines modeling s milar 
generators operating in parallel in the same power plant. In 
control area 2, nuclear units were considered as must run 
units and not participating in secondary frequency control. 
All the hydro and thermal units were considered to 
participate in primary and secondary frequency control. 
Fig. 1 also presents two graphics, reporting the considered 
values of installed capacity for each type of generating 
unit, maximum import value provided from control are  2, 
and minimum and maximum load in each control area. 
In order to obtain the dynamic behavior of thermal, 
hydro and nuclear units, the usual corresponding local 
frequency regulator models as described in [4] were used, 
including also the voltage regulator behavior adopting an 
IEEE1 model type. Wind generators were modeled by a 
classical 3rd order asynchronous machine model. The AGC 
system response was also modeled, adopting the traditional 
integral control approach and using the configuration 
described in [5], which includes a participation factor for 
each generator in order to maintain generating unit’s at the 
most economic operating conditions. For all the 
parameters of the power system model, typical values were 
considered, and extracted from the full Portuguese - 
Spanish interconnected system. 
During the test system definition, a major concern was 
to obtain typical dynamic behaviors of power flows in 
transmission lines. To validate this issue, the dynamic 
simulation results provided by the created test system were 
compared with the ones provided by the PSS/E program 
[6], for a complete model of the Portuguese – Spanish 
interconnected system, including an equivalent of France. 
Fig. 2 illustrates some of the obtained dynamic results 
fr m simulating a short-circuit, in a critical busbar of the 
Portuguese transmission system, that provokes the loss of 
522 MW of renewable power generation in the Portuguese 
system, for a typical operating scenario of winter p ak in 
the year 2006. Model validation was performed by 
comparing the dynamic results of the interconnected test 
system with the ones provided by the complete model f 
the Portuguese – Spanish transmission system, as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
III.  STEP 2: DATA SET GENERATION 
After validating the created test system, a Data Se (DS) 
was generated, consisting on a high number of pre-
analyzed scenarios, aiming to obtain a complete 
characterization of the dynamic security of control area 1 
regarding a severe wind power disturbance. This data w s 
necessary to extract the AL security structures. 
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Fig. 1.  Interconnected test system (single-line diagram, installed capacity, maximum import value, mini um and maximum load) 
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Fig. 2.  Dynamic results for the active power flow in transmission line 2-
1 (a 30 seconds simulation without AGC operation) 
A.  Analyzed Security Problem 
In the developed work, system security was evaluated 
regarding a short-circuit that takes place in a sensitive line 
of the transmission system (one of the two parallel lines 
connecting buses 15 and 16 of the test system presented in 
Fig. 1). A time of 300 ms was considered before the 
disconnection of the faulty line, leading to the loss of the 
nearest wind generating units due to the triggering of their 
under-voltage protection relays (which operate if the 
voltage drops bellow 0.9 p.u.). 
System was considered to lose security if, 2 minutes 
after the disturbance, any transmission line k  of control 
area 1 is 20% above the maximum electrical current 
technical limit for steady-sate operation kIz , i.e. if: 
( ) 1 2 kkI 120s . Iz> ×  (1) 
where ( )kI 120s  is the electrical current in line k  2 
minutes after the disturbance. To illustrate an insecure 
situation, Fig. 3 presents the dynamic behavior of electrical 
current in transmission line 15-16 (the line that remains 
connecting buses 15 and 16), that resulted from simulating, 
at 0 seconds, the analyzed disturbance for one of the 
generated operating scenarios. This figure illustrates a 
typical situation where, although AGC operation is 
beneficial to reduce the initial large increase of load in line 
15-16, this action is very slow and, therefore, thelin  
remains with overload problems for a long period of time. 
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Iz: max. electrical current technical limit, in line 15-16, for steady-sate 
operation. 
Fig. 3.  Example of an insecure situation 
B.  Data Set Generation Procedure 
A special care was devoted to the DS generation 
procedure, in order to cover all possible operating 
conditions of the power system that have a relevant 
influence on the type of dynamic problem under analysis – 
congestions in quasi-steady state that violate the 
acceptable limits for temporary overloads in transmission 
lines, after a fault that may lead to major wind power 
losses. 
To generate this data, an automatic and general 
procedure was implemented, able to generate a DS for any 
interconnected system with two control areas, whose main 
steps are properly described in [7] and [8]. This includes a 
full dynamic simulation, for each feasible generated 
operating scenario, comprising AGC operation in order to 
obtain an accurate value for the analyzed post-faul 
condition of each transmission line k : ( )kI 120s . 
After the computation of each dynamic simulation, a 
pattern is added to the DS, being characterized by all the 
variables needed to describe the system pre-fault operating 
conditions – the candidate input features for the AL 
security structures – and a vector containing the obtained 
value of ( )kI 120s  for each transmission line k  of control 
area 1 – the security indices to be evaluated by the AL 
security structures. 
C.  Data Set Settings for the Created Test System 
In the DS generation procedure performed for the 
created test system, the load was considered to change 
from light load scenario to peak load scenario. Forthe 
wind power sampling procedure, a 0.8 value was 
considered for the probability of each wind park being in 
operation, the number of connected units in each wind 
park was sampled between 80% and 100% of the total 
installed number, and the wind generators capacitor factor 
was considered to change from 10% to 100%. The import 
level provided from control area 2 was considered to 
change from 0 to 1700 MW. For the scheduling and 
dispatch of the conventional units, 2 different situations 
were taken into account – a thermal based and a hydro 
based dispatch scenario. Also, special care was taken in 
order to generate scenarios with higher spinning reserves 
mainly provided by hydro power plants. The idea was to 
include the system behavior regarding likely preventi  
control solutions, having in mind the results presented in 
[9], where it was concluded that in systems with very high 
wind power production, where secondary control is mainly 
provided by thermal power plants, the operation of 
additional or faster secondary control (provided by storage 
- hydro production) is required in order not to compromise 
the quality of generation control. 
D.  Data Set Results 
By applying the DS generation procedure with the 
previous described settings, 4596 patterns were genrated 
for the created test system. From this set, a totalnumber of 
983 patterns (approximately 21 % of the DS) were 
classified as insecure, by presenting temporary overl ad 
problems for some of the 7 transmission lines that are 
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mentioned in Fig. 4. This figure presents the total number 
of obtained insecure/secure patterns for each one of the 7 
transmission lines, which were identified to be criti al for 
the disturbance under analysis. Obviously, the connection 
between bus 15 and 16 is the one with a major number of 
insecure scenarios, since it loses one of the two parallel 
installed lines. 
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Fig. 4.  Number of insecure/secure patterns in the DS 
 
Fig. 5 presents the histogram for the obtained values of 
I(120s) for line 15-16 and line 15-17. A similar well 
distributed values of I(120s) was obtained for the remaining 
5 critical lines (presented in [8]), which illustrates the 
quality of the generated DS. 
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Legend – min/max: minimum/maximum value; std: standard deviation; 
N: total nº of patterns; Iz(Summer/Winter): maximum electrical current 
technical limit, for steady-sate operation, in Summer/Winter. 
Fig. 5.  Histogram of the obtained I(120s) values for lines 15-16 and 15-
17 
IV.  STEP 3: SECURITY EVALUATION WITH AL  
TECHNIQUES 
A.  Introduction 
In order to obtain fast and accurate security evaluations, 
for the dynamic problem under analysis, the following AL 
techniques were tested: Artificial Neural Networks (ANN); 
Linear Regression Models (LRM) and Linear Regression 
Trees (LRT). 
    1)  Candidate input features 
Before extracting the AL structures, 63 pre-fault 
operating conditions of control area 1 were selected as 
candidate input features, describing: 
 1load ,acP  (MW): total active load in control area 1; 
 iNc , iPc  (MW) and iVc  (p.u.): number of connected 
units, active power production and terminal voltage in 
conventional power station i  (for 1 14i , ,= … ); 
 jNw  and jPw  (MW): number of connected units and 
mechanical power in wind park j (for 1 10j , ,= … ). 
These features were empirically selected, in order to 
consider all the SCADA available data that may be 
relevant to explain the dynamic behavior under analysis, 
namely, a feature set characterizing pre-fault steady-state 
conditions and the dynamic behavior of active powers. 
This input set was also defined to include all the necessary 
controllable operating conditions, in order to implement 
the following type of preventive control measures: 
 conventional units re-schedule and/or re-dispatch; 
 wind generators disconnection and/or mechanical 
power reduction; 
 with or without including interchange power flows 
modifications. 
Besides, in order not to compromise the preventive 
control algorithm execution times, non-directly 
controllable conditions, like steady-state pre-fault value of 
power flows in transmission lines or any other system 
condition that results from a power flow solution, were 
discarded. 
    2)  Partition of the DS 
To avoid overfitting problems during the AL structures 
training procedure, and also to obtain a proper 
performance evaluation between extracted structures, th  
Holdout technique was applied. Regarding this technique, 
the generated DS was randomly divided in two subsets, 
being one of these sets used for training (the training set) 
and the remaining set (the Holdout or testing set) for 
performance evaluation. By following this procedure, 3596 
of the generated patterns for the created test system were 
selected for training and the remaining 1000 patterns were 
left for testing. Within the ANN training procedure, 1000 
of the training patterns were randomly selected to efine 
the validation set. 
B.  Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) 
In this research, an ANN based tool was applied taking 
into account the known superiority of this technique to 
provide accurate security evaluations, regarding other 
power system dynamic security problems (as presented i  
[10] and [11]). 
    1)  Design of the ANN security structures 
For ANN training, the MATLAB Neural Network 
Toolbox tool was used [12]. ANN parameters were found 
through the Levenberg-Marquardt backpropagation 
algorithm and by considering the usual data pre-processing 
procedures (normalization of inputs/outputs variables to 
have zero mean and standard deviation of one; random 
initialization of ANN parameters between –1 and 1). To 
perform overfitting control, besides considering a 
maximum epochs number, when the validation error 
increases for a specified number of iterations, the training 
is stopped. The used ANN structure was a two-layer 
feedforward network, with a tan-sigmoid transfer function 
in the hidden layer and a linear transfer function n the 
output layer. To choose the number of hidden units, an 
empirical rule, as described in [13], was used. According 
to this rule, the number of hidden units of a single hidden 
layer network is given by ( ) ( )1nt k no ni no− + + , where 
nt  is the number of training patterns; k is a constant 
factor [ ]10;5∈ ; ni  and no  are the number of input and 
output variables. 
    2)  Selection of the best ANN Input/Output set 
For the ANN output set, two hypotheses were 
considered: 
 to use only one ANN to evaluate I(120s) for all the 
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critical lines; 
 to use a different ANN to evaluate I(120s) for each 
critical line. 
For the ANN input set, the following hypotheses were 
considered: 
 to use all the 63 candidate input features; 
 to use only the candidate input features that are selected 
by an automatic Feature Subset Selection (FSS) 
procedure that is applied to extract a LRM – the LRM 
variable selection stepwise method. 
To choose the input/output set solution that provides the 
most accurate ANN security structures, a comparative 
analysis was performed regarding the testing set regression 
errors provided from each considered solution. These 
applied methods (i.e., the FSS and the comparative 
analysis procedures) and the obtained results for the 
created test system are properly described in [7]. From this 
work, the main conclusions were the following: 
 Using a different ANN to evaluate security for each 
critical line, is the most accurate option. 
 The FSS applied method showed to be effective, since, 
for most of the evaluated lines, it was capable of 
improving ANN accuracy, while for the remaining lines 
its application never provoked a ANN accuracy 
deterioration. 
C.  Linear Regression Models (LRM) 
The security problem under analysis regards quasi-
steady state post-disturbance system behavior. Regardin  
this, it is appropriated to assume that the analyzed behavior 
could be accurately characterized by linear regression 
models (LRM). In the developed work, the main goal f 
this achievement was to use the obtained LRM as dynamic 
security linear restrictions. This enabled the 
implementation of an algorithm, for providing preventive 
control measures, based in the resolution of linear 
optimization problems and, therefore, by benefiting from 
the usual advantages of solving this kind of problems (i.e., 
small computational efforts and the capability to achieve 
the optimal solution). 
    1)  Design of the LRM security structures 
For the created test case, a different LRM was design d 
to evaluate I(120s) for each critical line. These were 
extracted by the LRM training algorithm available in SPSS 
software tool [14] that includes the stepwise variable 
selection method. For the LRM input set, the 63 earlier 
described features were considered. However, the total
active load in control area 1 ( 1load ,acP ) was replaced by the 
import value provided from control area 2 (Im p ), 
calculated by: 
14 10
1
1 1
load ,ac i j
i j
Im p P Pc Pw
= =
 
= −  + 
 
 
∑ ∑  (2) 
In fact, by using the 1load ,acP  input feature, the values 
achieved by the LRM parameters showed to be 
inconsistent with the existing engineering knowledg of 
the cause/effect problem under analysis. This could t rn 
out inefficient the use of LRM to obtain preventive control 
measures. By replacing 1load ,acP  (which has the problem to 
enclose much of the relevance of the remaining input 
features) by the Im p  information (which allows not to 
lose any information from discharging 1load ,acP ), this 
problem became solved without deteriorating the accuracy 
of the LRM structures. 
D.  Linear Regression Trees (LRT) 
Within the general application of supervised AL 
methods, in [15] L. Torgo suggests to extract LRM in the 
leafs of a classical Regression Tree (RT, presented in 
[16]), in order to improve accuracy of LRM and RT. This 
hybrid model was named Linear Regression Tree (LRT). 
Motivated by this work, this type of AL technique was also 
explored to evaluate security for the created test sy em, 
aiming to achieve more accurate dynamic security linear 
restrictions. 
    1)  Design of the LRT security structures 
For the created test case, a different LRT with 7 nodes 
was designed to evaluate I(120s) for each critical line. 
The tree structure accuracy may be improved by 
considering input features with higher relevance and it is 
not jeopardized by having input features with strong 
relations among them. Regarding this, for the RT training, 
besides the 63 features earlier described, some extra 
candidate input features were also considered. However, 
the preventive control purposes introduced some 
restrictions to the type of input feature to consider for the 
RT design. In fact, in order to guard the linearity of the 
dynamic security restrictions, the tree structure can not 
include any preventive control variable. In order to 
illustrate this, Fig. 6 presents the tree structure of the LRT 
extracted to evaluate security for line 15-16, regading the 
following preventive control alternative purposes: 
A) with no control measures restrictions; 
B) conventional units re-dispatch and wind power 
reduction ( iPc  and jPw  were discarded for tree 
design); 
C) conventional units re-schedule/re-dispatch and wind 
units disconnection/power reduction, including 
interchange power flows modifications 
( iNc , iPc , jNw , jPw  and Im p  were discarded for 
tree design). 
yes no
1
{ }> ?ac1Pw 1916 MW
4 5
32
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1acPw : total mech. power developed by wind parks of control area 1. 
Fig. 6.  Tree structure of the LRT extracted with lnearity restrictions 
regarding alternative control measures - security evaluation of line 15-16 
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E.  Security Structures Performance Evaluation 
Fig. 7 presents the testing set regression errors pvided 
by each type of extracted AL structure, to perform security 
evaluation for the created test problem. The considere  
regression error was the following: 
( ) ( )22
1 1
np np
i i i
i i
ˆRE u u u u
= =
= − −∑ ∑  (3) 
where iu / iû : real/emulated value of I(120s) for pattern i ; 
np : nº of testing patterns; u : mean value of I(120s) in the 
testing set. These results show that, for the type of dynamic 
behavior under analysis, ANN were clearly the more 
accurate security evaluation structures. Therefore, ANN 
are the most suitable structures to perform on-line security 
monitoring functions. Fig. 7 also reveals that the LRT 
extracted with no control restrictions were more accurate 
than LRM. 
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Fig. 7.  Regression errors provided by LRM, LRT(alt. A) and ANN 
Fig. 8 presents the testing set regression errors pvided 
by the LRM and the several LRT extracted with linearity 
restrictions, regarding alternative preventive contr l 
purposes (tree structures presented in Fig. 6), to evaluate 
security for line 15-16. These results illustrate that, 
although needing to include linearity restrictions during 
training, LRT provide more accurate dynamic security 
linear restrictions than LRM. 
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Fig. 8.  Regression errors provided by LRM and the LRT extracted with 
alternative preventive control purposes (security evaluation of line 15-
16) 
 
To obtain a better insight of the individual error 
provided by each type of AL structure, Fig. 9 present  the 
single regression error ( )i iˆu u−  obtained for each testing 
pattern i , to evaluate security for line 15-16. These results 
show that, although ANN generally presents the most 
accurate evaluation, none of the security structures p ovide 
excessive security evaluating errors. 
V.  STEP 4: PREVENTIVE CONTROL MEASURES SUPPLY 
A.  Preventive Control Algorithm Design 
The architecture of the developed security monitoring / 
preventive control approach is presented in Fig. 10. Under 
this architecture, security monitoring is performed using 
ANN, while preventive control measures are obtained 
through the solution of a linear optimization problem 
where linear security structures are used as dynamic 
security restrictions. 
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Legend: 
u: known value of I(120s); û: emulated value of I(120s); Iz(Summer): 
maximum electrical current technical limit in the line, for steady-sate 
operation, in Summer. 
Fig. 9.  Testing set single regression errors provided by LRM, LRT(alt. 
A) and ANN - security evaluation of line 15-16 
 
The objective of the implemented optimization problem 
was to minimize the amplitude and the number of 
preventive control measures required to reach system 
security. For a particular insecure operating scenario, the 
algorithm starts with a restricted type of preventive control 
measures, only allowing conventional units re-dispatch nd 
wind power reduction with no interchange power flows 
modifications. Each time the optimization problem fails to 
reach system security, some extra control measures ar  
allowed, like including interchange power flows 
modifications or wind generators disconnection or, even, 
conventional units re-schedule. 
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Fig. 10.  Architecture of the security monitoring / preventive control 
approach 
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B.  Preventive Control Results for the Created Test Sy tem 
    1)  Performance evaluation results 
To measure the quality of the proposed algorithm, a 
performance evaluation was carried out by applying this
approach to solve the analysed security problem for the 
created test system. From this analysis, which is properly 
reported in [8], the obtained results showed that the
proposed algorithm was extremely suitable regarding the 
following results: 
 execution times; 
 the quality of the provided control measures, measured 
by the total MW modifications and the number of 
generating units with operating conditions 
modifications. 
The obtained results also showed that the rate of 
success of the proposed algorithm in finding any 
preventive control measures may be considerable 
increased by including, in a inferior merit order, some 
variants of the optimization problem using ANN security 
restrictions. In fact, for the analyzed test system, this 
provided an increase of the success rate from 58% (i.e., a 
solution was found for 575 of the 983 insecure patterns) to 
95% (i.e., a solution was found for 937 of the 983 insecure 
patterns). 
    2)  Suggested preventive control measures – Example 
In order to illustrate the capabilities of this approach, an 
example is described and discussed next. Fig. 11 presents, 
in the column chart untitled “Initial insecure scenario”, the 
general steady-state conditions of control area 1 of the 
created test system, for an insecure situation. In fact, for 
this scenario, ANN identified temporary overload 
problems in line 15-16, by outputting 
( ) 1 215-16I 120s .  p.u.>  regarding the disturbance under 
analysis. For this scenario, the preventive control 
algorithm provided the control measures that are described 
in Fig. 12, namely: a total power reduction, of 186 MW, in 
the wind parks of control area 1, which must be totally 
compensated by an increase of the active power producti n 
in C5 hydro power station (resulting, therefore, in a same 
amount of spinning reserve reduction). The suggested wind 
power reduction results from a capacitor factor reduction 
of 16% (39 MW) in wind park W1, 15% (59 MW) in wind 
park W4, 17% (14 MW) in wind park W5, 18% (20 MW) 
in wind park W6, and 5% (54 MW) in wind park W7. The 
general steady-state conditions of control area 1 that result 
from applying these control measures are the ones 
presented in Fig. 11, in the column chart untitled 
“Modified scenario”. 
In order to validate these control measures, dynamic 
simulations were also performed for the “Initial insecure” 
and the “Modified” scenarios. The dynamic behaviors f 
the electrical current in transmission line 15-16, for the 
two scenarios, are presented in Fig. 13. These results show 
that the suggested control measures were able to eliminate 
the temporary overload problem of line 15-16. This was 
provided by reducing the steady-state pre-disturbance 
value of the electrical current in line 15-16 (mainly by 
increasing the active power production in C5 power 
station) and also by reducing the severity effect of the wind 
power loss (by reducing the wind power production before 
the disturbance). 
Import Wind Thermal Hydro
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Fig. 11.  Pre-disturbance steady-state conditions fr control area 1 of the 
created test system  
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Legend: 
SR: total spinning reserve modification for control area 1; 
Pw: total mechanical power mod. in the wind parks of c. area 1; 
Pc: total active power prod. mod. in conventional units of c. area 1; 
∆ Pc5: active power production mod. in C5 conv. power station; 
∆ cf: capacitor factor mod. in each wind park of contr l area 1; 
∆ Pw: mechanical power mod. in each wind park of control area 1. 
Fig. 12.  Suggested preventive control measures 
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Fig. 13.  Dynamic results for the “Initial insecure” and “Modified” 
scenarios 
Fig. 14 presents an extended overview of the effect of 
the adoption of the preventive control measures. This can 
be understood by analyzing the behavior of the electrical 
current in each transmission line of control area 1, for the 
“Initial insecure” and the “Modified” scenarios. 
These results show that the suggested control measures 
were also able to avoid temporary overload problem in all 
the transmission lines of the control area. 
A similar analysis was performed for other insecure 
scenarios of the created test system (some results can be 
found in [8]), which resulted in the same type of 
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the preventi e 
control measures suggested by the proposed algorithm. 
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Legend – I(0s): steady-sate pre-disturbance value of lectrical current in the line; I(120s): electrical current in the line, 2 minutes after the 
disturbance; I(900s): electrical current in the line, 15 minutes after the disturbance (i.e., after AGC control action). 
Fig. 14.  Dynamic results for the “Initial insecure” and “Modified” scenarios (security evaluation forall the transmission lines of control area 1) 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper described the main steps needed to design a 
security assessment / preventive control tool to be used in 
EMS of power systems having to face large scale 
integration of wind generation that has no fault ride 
through capabilities. The adoption of Automatic Learning 
techniques is the key issue for the success of this approach 
regarding the on-line effectiveness. 
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